

**People v. Jared Daniel Adams. 16PDJ013. November 8, 2016.**

Following a sanctions hearing, the Presiding Disciplinary Judge disbarred Jared Daniel Adams (attorney registration number 41154) from the practice of law. Adams's disbarment took effect on December 13, 2016.

Adams abandoned clients in six cases. In one case, Adams left a client at trial without counsel. In two other cases, Adams's neglect resulted in warrants being issued for the arrest of his clients. Adams caused significant hardship as a result of his failure to respond to clients' communications across these cases. Adams also appeared in court with methamphetamine in his briefcase.

Through this misconduct, Adams violated Colo. RPC 1.3 (a lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness when representing a client); Colo. RPC 1.4(a)(3) (a lawyer shall keep the client reasonably informed); Colo. RPC 1.4(a)(4) (a lawyer shall promptly comply with reasonable requests for information); Colo. RPC 1.15A (a lawyer shall safeguard client property); Colo. RPC 1.16(d) (a lawyer shall protect a client's rights upon termination); Colo. RPC 3.4(c) (a lawyer shall not knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal); Colo. RPC 8.1(b) (a lawyer shall not knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information in a disciplinary matter); Colo. RPC 8.4(b) (it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects); Colo. RPC 8.4(c) (a lawyer shall not engage in dishonest conduct); and Colo. RPC 8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice).

Please see the full opinion below.

<p style="text-align: center;">SUPREME COURT, STATE OF COLORADO</p> <p style="text-align: center;">ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE 1300 BROADWAY, SUITE 250 DENVER, CO 80203</p>	
<p><b>Complainant:</b> THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO</p> <p><b>Respondent:</b> JARED DANIEL ADAMS</p>	<p>Case Number: <b>16PDJo13</b></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>OPINION AND DECISION IMPOSING SANCTIONS UNDER C.R.C.P. 251.19(c)</b></p>	

Jared Daniel Adams (“Respondent”) abandoned clients in six cases. In one case, Respondent left a client at trial without counsel. In two other cases, Respondent’s neglect resulted in warrants being issued for the arrest of his clients. Respondent caused significant hardship as a result of his failure to respond to clients’ communications across these cases. Last, Respondent appeared in court with methamphetamine in his briefcase. His misconduct warrants disbarment.

### **I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

Respondent was immediately suspended by the Colorado Supreme Court on March 11, 2016, for abandoning clients and posing an immediate threat to the administration of justice under C.R.C.P. 251.8(b)(2).

On May 9, 2016, Jacob M. Vos of the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel (“the People”) filed a complaint against Respondent with Presiding Disciplinary Judge William R. Lucero (“the Court”). The complaint alleged misconduct in seven matters. The People sent the complaint by certified mail to all of Respondent’s known addresses, including his last registered business address of 600 17th Street, Suite 2800 South, Denver, Colorado 80202; his home address of 1686 South Lansing Court, Aurora, Colorado 80012; a third known address of 2506 Wapiti Road, Fort Collins, Colorado 80525; and Respondent’s email address, jared@adamslawcolorado.com. Respondent failed to answer, and the Court granted the People’s motion for default on July 14, 2016. Upon entry of default, the Court deemed all

facts set forth in the complaint admitted and all rule violations established by clear and convincing evidence.<sup>1</sup>

On October 4, 2016, the Court held a sanctions hearing under C.R.C.P. 251.15(b). Vos represented the People, and Respondent did not appear. At the hearing, Jason Suss provided a witness statement via telephone, and Edward Haley, Yolanda Johnson, and Liliana Perez all testified in person about their experiences with Respondent.

## **II. ESTABLISHED FACTS AND RULE VIOLATIONS**

Respondent took the oath of admission and was admitted to the bar of the Colorado Supreme Court on October 26, 2009, under attorney registration number 41154.<sup>2</sup> He is thus subject to the Court's jurisdiction in these disciplinary proceedings.<sup>3</sup>

### **Arndt Matter**

Stefani Arndt, an Adams County law clerk, found a briefcase that had been left in Judge Wellings's courtroom overnight on October 30, 2015.<sup>4</sup> Arndt determined the briefcase owner's identity by looking through it and finding documents that revealed the case belonged to Respondent.<sup>5</sup> A vial of white powder and a syringe were also in the briefcase; a field test by courthouse deputies identified the powder as methamphetamine.<sup>6</sup> Respondent retrieved the briefcase later that day and confirmed that it was his.<sup>7</sup>

Relatedly, on November 25, 2015, Aurora police officer David A. Johnson responded to a domestic violence call at Respondent's residence.<sup>8</sup> Respondent's husband and partner of ten years, Tyler Smith, told Officer Johnson that he had found methamphetamine and syringes in the home, and that when confronted about this discovery, Respondent assaulted him.<sup>9</sup> Respondent was not arrested, but officers seized the methamphetamine from the home.<sup>10</sup> Respondent thereby violated C.R.S. section 18-18-403.5, unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a class-four felony.<sup>11</sup>

In this matter, Respondent violated C.R.C.P. 251.5(b), which provides that any criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer is grounds for discipline, and Colo. RPC 8.4(b), which states that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to commit a criminal act.

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<sup>1</sup> See C.R.C.P. 251.15(b); *People v. Richards*, 748 P.2d 341, 346 (Colo. 1987).

<sup>2</sup> Compl. ¶ 1.

<sup>3</sup> See C.R.C.P. 251.1(b).

<sup>4</sup> Compl. ¶ 2.

<sup>5</sup> Compl. ¶ 4.

<sup>6</sup> Compl. ¶ 5.

<sup>7</sup> Compl. ¶ 6.

<sup>8</sup> Compl. ¶ 7.

<sup>9</sup> Compl. ¶ 8.

<sup>10</sup> Compl. ¶ 9.

<sup>11</sup> Compl. ¶ 10.

### Johnson Matter

Yolanda Johnson hired Respondent to represent her in a bankruptcy proceeding in early 2015.<sup>12</sup> Respondent failed to diligently handle the matter, resulting in the case's dismissal for nonpayment of fees.<sup>13</sup> Respondent then filed a second bankruptcy for Johnson, which the court dismissed because of Respondent's failure to file necessary documents.<sup>14</sup> Respondent met with Johnson on September 29, 2015, and asked her if he could complete her case on a pro bono basis.<sup>15</sup> Respondent told Johnson that he had been living under the constant threat of abuse by his spouse, who had destroyed his files.<sup>16</sup> Johnson agreed to give Respondent another chance after he refunded her previous payments.<sup>17</sup> She then gave him additional documents relevant to her bankruptcy, but she never heard from him again despite her efforts to contact him.<sup>18</sup>

In this matter, Respondent violated Colo. RPC 1.3, which states that a lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness when representing a client; Colo. RPC 1.4(a)(3), which states that a lawyer shall keep the client reasonably informed; Colo. RPC 1.4(a)(4), which states that a lawyer shall promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and Colo. RPC 1.16(d), which states that a lawyer shall protect a client's rights upon termination.

### Anton Matter

Respondent entered his appearance in the case of *People v. Eric Anton*, Clear Creek County case number 2015T222, in March 2015.<sup>19</sup> Respondent failed to appear for trial on November 18, 2015.<sup>20</sup> Anton told the court that he had been unable to contact Respondent for weeks.<sup>21</sup> District Attorney Bruce Brown, who prosecuted the Anton case, was also unable to contact Respondent, so the trial was continued as a result of Respondent's failure to appear.<sup>22</sup>

Respondent's lack of attention to this matter violated Colo. RPC 1.3; Colo. RPC 1.4(a)(3); Colo. RPC 1.16(d); and Colo. RPC 8.4(d), which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.

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<sup>12</sup> Compl. ¶ 14.

<sup>13</sup> Compl. ¶ 15.

<sup>14</sup> Compl. ¶ 16.

<sup>15</sup> Compl. ¶ 17.

<sup>16</sup> Compl. ¶ 18.

<sup>17</sup> Compl. ¶¶ 19-20.

<sup>18</sup> Compl. ¶¶ 21-22.

<sup>19</sup> Compl. ¶ 32.

<sup>20</sup> Compl. ¶ 33.

<sup>21</sup> Compl. ¶ 34.

<sup>22</sup> Compl. ¶¶ 35-36.

### **Suss Matter**

Jason Suss hired Respondent to handle a DUI matter.<sup>23</sup> In July 2015 Respondent entered his appearance in Suss's DUI case in Clear Creek County case number 2015T405.<sup>24</sup> Suss and Respondent failed to appear for three hearings.<sup>25</sup> Suss was never informed about these hearings.<sup>26</sup> As a result, an arrest warrant was issued for Suss, which has since been rescinded.<sup>27</sup> District Attorney Brown prosecuted the Suss case and was unable to contact Respondent regarding this matter.<sup>28</sup> Suss paid Respondent \$1,500.00 for his work, but he received no benefit; Respondent never returned the \$1,500.00 to Suss.<sup>29</sup>

Respondent's abandonment of Suss violated Colo. RPC 1.3; Colo. RPC 1.4(a)(3); Colo. RPC 1.16(d); Colo. RPC 1.15A, which states that a lawyer shall safeguard client property; Colo. RPC 8.4(c), which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in dishonest conduct; and Colo. RPC 8.4(d).

### **Haley Matter**

Edward Haley hired Respondent to handle his DUI charge and two later charges for driving with a revoked license.<sup>30</sup> Haley paid Respondent \$4,000.00.<sup>31</sup> Haley reached Respondent only sporadically, but Respondent told Haley that he would attend scheduled court appearances for him.<sup>32</sup> Haley learned through other sources that arrest warrants had been issued for his failure to appear at court hearings.<sup>33</sup> Haley was unsuccessful in reaching Respondent from his home in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, so he returned to Colorado to seek out Respondent.<sup>34</sup>

After Haley confronted Respondent in front of his office building, Respondent told Haley that he was not well and that he was working with another attorney.<sup>35</sup> On January 14, 2016, Respondent told Haley that another attorney would be contacting him to assist in the matter, but Haley was never contacted by another attorney.<sup>36</sup> Haley successfully requested

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<sup>23</sup> Compl. ¶ 45.

<sup>24</sup> Compl. ¶ 46.

<sup>25</sup> Compl. ¶ 47.

<sup>26</sup> Compl. ¶ 48.

<sup>27</sup> Compl. ¶ 49.

<sup>28</sup> Compl. ¶¶ 50-51.

<sup>29</sup> Compl. ¶¶ 53-54.

<sup>30</sup> Compl. ¶ 67.

<sup>31</sup> Compl. ¶ 68.

<sup>32</sup> Compl. ¶¶ 69-71.

<sup>33</sup> Compl. ¶ 73.

<sup>34</sup> Compl. ¶ 74.

<sup>35</sup> Compl. ¶ 75.

<sup>36</sup> Compl. ¶¶ 77-78.

that the court remove Respondent from the case, and he hired another attorney.<sup>37</sup> Haley was never repaid the \$4,000.00 he gave Respondent.<sup>38</sup>

Respondent's conduct in the Haley matter violated Colo. RPC 1.3; Colo. RPC 1.4(a)(3); Colo. RPC 1.16(d); Colo. RPC 1.15A; Colo. RPC 8.4(c); and Colo. RPC 8.4(d).

### **Nunez Matter**

Respondent represented Andrea Nunez in post-decree matters concerning child support in Adams County District Court case number 2000DR1446, in which he entered his appearance in April 2015.<sup>39</sup> Respondent failed to appear for a hearing on January 5, 2016, but contacted the court to say he was ill.<sup>40</sup> The court unsuccessfully tried to contact Respondent.<sup>41</sup> Further, Respondent failed to comply with his C.R.C.P. 16 disclosure obligations after the court ordered him to do so.<sup>42</sup> Nunez was unable to reach Respondent before the rescheduled hearing date of January 26, 2016, and she filed a motion seeking his removal as her attorney.<sup>43</sup> The court set a hearing on the issue for January 13, 2016, but Respondent failed to appear; the court continued the trial due to Respondent's abandonment and granted the motion requesting withdrawal.<sup>44</sup>

Through his misconduct in the Haley matter, Respondent violated Colo. RPC 1.3; Colo. RPC 1.4(a)(3); Colo. RPC 3.4(c), which states that a lawyer shall not knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal; Colo. RPC 8.4(c); and Colo. RPC 8.4(d).

### **Perez Matter**

Liliana Perez hired Respondent to handle her DUI case in September 2015, and she paid him \$1,500.00, representing half of his flat fee.<sup>45</sup> Although Respondent entered an appearance in the matter, he performed no other work.<sup>46</sup> Shortly before her trial Perez attempted to contact Respondent; that effort having failed, she went to his office and was told by a building attendant that Respondent no longer leased space there.<sup>47</sup> Perez's immigration attorney, Kyle Wasser, spoke with Respondent once in September 2015 and told him that it was imperative he be kept informed of developments in Perez's DUI case.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Compl. ¶ 80.

<sup>38</sup> Compl. ¶ 81.

<sup>39</sup> Compl. ¶¶ 94-96.

<sup>40</sup> Compl. ¶¶ 98-100.

<sup>41</sup> Compl. ¶ 101.

<sup>42</sup> Compl. ¶ 102.

<sup>43</sup> Compl. ¶¶ 103-04.

<sup>44</sup> Compl. ¶¶ 105-11.

<sup>45</sup> Compl. ¶¶ 122-23.

<sup>46</sup> Compl. ¶ 124.

<sup>47</sup> Compl. ¶¶ 126-27.

<sup>48</sup> Compl. ¶¶ 128-29.

Wasser was thereafter unable to reach Respondent.<sup>49</sup> Respondent did not refund the \$1,500.00 to Perez.<sup>50</sup>

In the Perez matter, Respondent violated Colo. RPC 1.3; Colo. RPC 1.4(a)(3); Colo. RPC 1.4(a)(4); Colo. RPC 1.15A; Colo. RPC 1.16(d); and Colo. RPC 8.4(c).

### **Failure to Respond in All Matters**

The People made many attempts between January 8 and March 9, 2016, to contact Respondent, all to no avail.<sup>51</sup> The People sent letters to Respondent's former attorney of record<sup>52</sup> regarding the Haley, Anton, Johnson, and Nunez matters, and these letters were all signed for and received.<sup>53</sup> All other communications the People sent directly to Respondent's known addresses, including letters regarding the Perez and Suss matters, were returned to the People as "unclaimed," or with an explanation that Respondent was "no longer at this address."<sup>54</sup> Other communication attempts failed as well.<sup>55</sup>

Through his failure to respond in this disciplinary matter, Respondent violated Colo. RPC 8.1(b), which states that a lawyer shall not knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information in a disciplinary matter.

### **III. SANCTIONS**

The American Bar Association *Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions* ("ABA Standards")<sup>56</sup> and Colorado Supreme Court case law guide the imposition of sanctions for lawyer misconduct.<sup>57</sup> When imposing a sanction after a finding of lawyer misconduct, the Court must consider the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, and the actual or potential injury caused by the misconduct. These three variables yield a presumptive sanction that may be adjusted based on aggravating and mitigating factors.

#### **ABA Standard 3.0 – Duty, Mental State, and Injury**

Duty: When Respondent neglected and abandoned his clients, he breached duties he owed to them to preserve and maintain their property, and to act with diligence and competence. When Respondent brought methamphetamine into court, he flouted a duty he owed to the legal profession and the public to conduct himself in a professional manner. Further, Respondent violated duties he owed to the legal profession when he failed to respond to the People's inquiries.

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<sup>49</sup> Compl. ¶ 130.

<sup>50</sup> Compl. ¶ 131.

<sup>51</sup> Compl. ¶ 144.

<sup>52</sup> Respondent was briefly represented by outside counsel, who has since withdrawn.

<sup>53</sup> Compl. ¶¶ 146-47, 150.

<sup>54</sup> Compl. ¶¶ 145, 151-53.

<sup>55</sup> Compl. ¶¶ 148-49.

<sup>56</sup> Found in ABA *Annotated Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions* (2015).

<sup>57</sup> See *In re Roose*, 69 P.3d 43, 46-47 (Colo. 2003).

Mental State: The Court's order entering default establishes that Respondent knowingly converted client funds. The Court infers from Respondent's extensive pattern of misconduct and his occasional communication with clients and other attorneys that he knowingly engaged in the remaining client-centered conduct described above. The Court also finds that Respondent's status as an attorney is sufficient to prove that he knowingly violated the law through his possession of methamphetamine, as attorneys are presumed to know the law.<sup>58</sup>

Injury: By failing to communicate with and provide diligent representation to his clients, Respondent caused them legal harm and severe emotional stress. His conversion of unearned fees seriously injured his clients, some of whom were financially quite vulnerable.

At the hearing, Suss provided a statement about the harm Respondent had caused him. Suss noted that due to Respondent's neglect, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. "That panicked me," said Suss. At that point, Suss retained another attorney. Although Suss's new attorney gave him a reduced rate in sympathy for Respondent's conduct, Suss's interaction with Respondent left him "frustrated and angry."

Respondent also abandoned Haley in a DUI matter. Haley testified that this made his life a "living hell" and "destroyed Christmas," because warrants were issued for his arrest on December 24 while he was on vacation in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico. Like Suss, Haley tried contacting Respondent repeatedly, about "40 to 50 times" by phone, email, Skype, and other means. Haley believed that Respondent received his messages, since the greeting message on Respondent's voicemail changed during that time. Eventually, Haley returned to Colorado, despite his fear of possible immigration and criminal consequences, and surprised Respondent outside his office. Respondent apologized and implored him to let him right his wrongs. That was the last time Haley heard from Respondent, though Respondent eventually filed a guilty plea on his behalf without his permission. Haley had trouble hiring another attorney, and he stated that Respondent's representation left him in a more precarious legal position than if he had never had any representation. Haley has not recovered the \$4,000.00 retainer he gave Respondent.

Respondent's neglect of Johnson's bankruptcy matter caused her "a lot of hurt and pain." Johnson established a personal connection with Respondent during an emotionally vulnerable time for her, because at first Respondent was very understanding and sympathetic. However, as time progressed, Respondent canceled meetings and never filed anything in court, leading to dismissal of her case. Respondent then made one conciliatory effort with Johnson, but only after he had reason to believe that she was pursuing a disciplinary action. When they met, Respondent said that he was suffering from "spousal abuse" and showed Johnson pictures of his disheveled home office, which he blamed on his husband. Johnson agreed to give him a second chance, but she never received any benefit from doing so, and a second bankruptcy was dismissed as a result of Respondent's neglect.

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<sup>58</sup> *In re Trupp*, 92 P.3d 923, 932 (Colo. 2004).



As a result, Johnson was left “emotionally drained” and without faith in attorneys or the legal system.

Perez testified that Respondent was responsive only when he was asking for money for her DUI matter. As a single mother, the \$1,500.00 she paid Respondent represented a significant sum, and she never received a refund. Perez testified that it was harder to resume her case with replacement counsel than if she had never hired Respondent in the first place. Perez said, “I trusted him, he failed me. He shouldn’t be representing people anymore.” Further, Respondent’s conduct unnecessarily complicated Perez’s separate immigration matter.

### **ABA Standards 4.0-7.0 – Presumptive Sanction**

Disbarment is the presumptive sanction for Respondent’s pattern of misconduct. ABA *Standard* 4.11 states that disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts client property, causing the client actual or potential injury. Disbarment is also warranted under ABA *Standard* 4.41, which calls for disbarment when a lawyer abandons the practice of law and causes serious injury to a client. ABA *Standard* 5.12, which states that suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in criminal conduct, applies to Respondent’s class-four felony. For Respondent’s knowing refusal to comply with a court order, thereby causing a client injury, ABA *Standard* 6.22 indicates that suspension is appropriate. Last, ABA *Standard* 7.2 applies to Respondent’s failure to respond to this disciplinary matter. That standard states that suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed to the profession and thereby causes injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.

### **ABA Standard 9.0 – Aggravating and Mitigating Factors**

Aggravating circumstances include any considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of the presumptive sanction to be imposed, while mitigating circumstances may warrant a reduction in the severity of the sanction.<sup>59</sup> Here, six circumstances aggravate Respondent’s misconduct: Respondent’s dishonest and selfish motive; a pattern of misconduct; multiple offenses; his refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct; the vulnerability of two of his clients;<sup>60</sup> and his indifference to making restitution.<sup>61</sup> Just two factors—Respondent’s lack of prior disciplinary history and his relative inexperience in the practice of law—mitigate his misconduct.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> See ABA Standards 9.21 & 9.31.

<sup>60</sup> As a single mother undergoing an immigration case, Perez was financially vulnerable. Johnson had recently suffered a traumatic homicide in her family, leaving her emotionally vulnerable to Respondent’s sometimes sympathetic entreaties to let him keep working on her case.

<sup>61</sup> ABA Standards 9.22(b)-(d), (g)-(h), & (j).

<sup>62</sup> ABA Standards 9.32(a), (f).

### **Analysis Under ABA Standards and Colorado Case Law**

The Court is aware of the Colorado Supreme Court's directive to exercise discretion in imposing a sanction and to carefully apply aggravating and mitigating factors,<sup>63</sup> mindful that "individual circumstances make extremely problematic any meaningful comparison of discipline ultimately imposed in different cases."<sup>64</sup> Though prior cases are helpful by way of analogy, the Court is charged with determining the appropriate sanction for a lawyer's misconduct on a case-by-case basis.

Colorado case law identifies disbarment as the proper sanction when a lawyer knowingly converts client funds, absent significant mitigation.<sup>65</sup> When conversion is coupled with abandonment, disbarment is all the more appropriate.<sup>66</sup> Respondent's several instances of misconduct, considered in conjunction with the six aggravating factors at play here—as well as his disregard of the disciplinary process and his failure to appear at the hearing—make clear that nothing less than Respondent's disbarment will adequately protect the public.

### **IV. CONCLUSION**

Throughout 2015, Respondent agreed to represent six clients, but he abandoned them all. In three of those cases, Respondent knowingly converted client funds and has failed to refund at least \$7,000.00 in unearned fees. Respondent appeared in court with methamphetamine, and officers later discovered more methamphetamine at Respondent's house. Despite circumstantial evidence that Respondent was experiencing a difficult family situation, this Court cannot extend credit in mitigation because Respondent has failed to participate in this disciplinary matter. Respondent has spurned his obligations as a lawyer and demonstrated general disrespect of the legal system. He should be disbarred.

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<sup>63</sup> See *In re Attorney F.*, 285 P.3d 322, 327 (Colo. 2012); *In re Fischer*, 89 P.3d 817, 822 (Colo. 2004) (finding that a hearing board had overemphasized the presumptive sanction and undervalued the importance of mitigating factors in determining the needs of the public).

<sup>64</sup> *In re Attorney F.*, 285 P.3d at 327 (quoting *In re Rosen*, 198 P.3d 116, 121 (Colo. 2008)).

<sup>65</sup> *In re Haines*, 177 P.3d 1239, 1250 (Colo. 2008); *In re Cleland*, 2 P.3d 700, 703 (Colo. 2000).

<sup>66</sup> See, e.g., *In re Stevenson*, 979 P.2d 1043, 1043-44 (Colo. 1999); *People v. Townshend*, 933 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Colo. 1997); *People v. Roybal*, 949 P.2d 993, 996-98 (Colo. 1997); *People v. Lefly*, 902 P.2d 361, 364 (Colo. 1995).

## V. ORDER

The Court therefore **ORDERS**:

1. **JARED DANIEL ADAMS**, attorney registration number **41154**, is **DISBARRED**. The **DISBARMENT SHALL** take effect only upon issuance of an “Order and Notice of Disbarment.”<sup>67</sup>
2. Respondent **SHALL** promptly comply with C.R.C.P. 251.28(a)-(c), concerning winding up of affairs, notice to parties in pending matters, and notice to parties in litigation.
3. Respondent also **SHALL** file with the Court, within fourteen days of issuance of the “Order and Notice of Disbarment,” an affidavit complying with C.R.C.P. 251.28(d), requiring an attorney to file an affidavit with the Court setting forth pending matters and attesting, *inter alia*, to notification of clients and other jurisdictions where the attorney is licensed.
4. The parties **MUST** file any post-hearing motion or application for stay pending appeal **on or before Tuesday, November 29, 2016**. No extensions of time will be granted. Any response thereto **MUST** be filed within seven days.
5. Respondent **SHALL** pay the costs of this proceeding. The People **SHALL** file a statement of costs **on or before Tuesday, November 22, 2016**. Any response thereto **MUST** be filed within seven days.
6. Respondent **SHALL PAY, no later than Tuesday, December 6, 2016, RESTITUTION** in the following amounts: \$4,000.00 to Edward Haley; \$1,500.00 to Jason Suss; and \$1,500.00 to Liliana Perez. Respondent’s full payment of costs and restitution is a condition precedent to his filing any petition for readmission.

DATED THIS 8<sup>th</sup> DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2016.

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WILLIAM R. LUCERO  
PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE

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<sup>67</sup> In general, an order and notice of disbarment will issue thirty-five days after a decision is entered under C.R.C.P. 251.19(b) or (c). In some instances, the order and notice may issue later than thirty-five days by operation of C.R.C.P. 251.27(h), C.R.C.P. 59, or other applicable rules.

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